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Post Decentralization Corruption:
A study on perpetual corruption at the local level in 
West Lombok
Abstract
The current article aims to explore corruption at the local level. There 
are two main discourses that set the background for this study. First, 
corruption is considered a result of decentralization, which opened up 
the local political structure. Second, corruption happened as a result of a 
societal shift along the prismatic continuum. These two main discourses 
serve as the theoretical background in research to find the meanings 
behind the reality of perpetual corruption occurring at the local level. 
The research employed the theory of decentralization and a prismatic 
society approach as analytical tools along with a phenomenological 
approach. The study found linkages in decentralization as a new reason 
for the growth and development of corruption at the local level on 
account of the prismatic structure empowering elite rulers to replicate 
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A systemic change from 
centralization to decentralization 
had altered the map of socio-
political power structures at 
the local level. Decentralization 
encompasses more than just 
the transition of government 
authority and power from the 
national to the subnational 
levels, it also involves changing 
the structure of dominance 
in the bureaucracy as well as 
opening up social and political 
opportunities for the emergence 
of local identity based forces and 
competition (Aspinall, 2010; 
Buehler, 2010; Schulte Nordholt & 
van Klinken, 2007), consequently 
creating a circulation of elites at 
the local level (Grindle, 2009). 
Throughout the authoritarian 
regime, military and bureaucratic 
officials coming from a particular 
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social identity secured strategic and substantial positions within the 
government. Decentralization had ended their dominance. Along the 
same line, it had brought about fundamental changes that led to the 
opening of local power structures, subsequently providing opportunities 
for local identities to express their political interests (J. Kingsley, 2012; 
Kingsley, 2012; Mietzner, 2014), which was also the case in Lombok. 
The island of Lombok is geographically located between two islands, 
Bali to the West (Lombok Strait), and Sumbawa to the East separated by 
the Alas strait. Administrative wise, Lombok consists of four regencies 
and one municipality, namely: West Lombok Regency, Central Lombok 
Regency, East Lombok Regency, North Lombok Regency, and Mataram 
Municipality as the capital of West Nusa Tenggara Province. Most of 
Lombok's populace are Muslims.1 It is known as an island of a thousand 
mosques (Telle, 2009; Tyson, 2013). Culturally speaking, the Sasak tribe 
is the majority in Lombok.2     
Post decentralization, Lombok’s socio-political dynamics has 
received a lot of attention from scholars. Decentralization provided 
civilians political opportunities to create political space for citizens 
wanting to express their voices at the local level, including in Lombok 
(Antlov, 2003). This led to the emergence of local-based security 
groups (Macdougall, 2007; Tyson, 2013), and the creation of political 
transformation opening arenas of contestation over political positions 
within the power structure at the local level (Gayatri, Irene et al., 2009). 
Decentralization also generated competitions based on ethnicity and 
status of Lombok’s elites, particularly religious leaders and the nobility 
(Kingsley, 2012). In brief, decentralization had strengthened the role of 
Tuan Guru (religious leaders) and weakened that of the menak (nobility) 
within Lombok’s local socio-political structure (Anwar, 2016; J. Kingsley, 
2012; Kingsley, 2012; Oktara, 2015; Putrawan, 2013).
A specific phenomenon concerning change in local structure is 
observed in West Lombok. It is historically noted that classification of 
local ethnicities was initiated at the time the Dutch governed Indonesia. 
The local identity framework was developed by viewing the nobility as 
local aristocrats (Schulte Nordholt & van Klinken, 2007). In the case of 
Lombok, colonizers (the Dutch, Japanese) included the nobility as a part 
of the colonial administrative structure. Bureaucracy was taught to the 
elites by opening the Hollandsch Indlandsche School for the nobility, 
who would then become pioneers in the civil service or high-ranking 
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2007; Magenda, 2005). The nobility’s genealogical 
power dominance in West Lombok’s government 
structure ended, particularly, following the 
implementation of electoral politics. There were 
three key changes in West Lombok’s social and 
political structures. First, decentralization ended 
the dominance of the nobility (menak) class within 
the power structure at the local level. Second, it 
opened up contestations without the dominance 
of any particular social stratification. Third, it 
became a starting point for the emergence of 
perpetual corruption. 
The structural change in local power post 
decentralization did not only usher in new local 
elites into the power structure, it also indicated 
the presence of perpetual corruption in West 
Lombok. It is recorded that Iskandar, the regent for 
the 1999-2009 period, was tried for corruption on 
account of swapping assets owned by the Regent 
Office of West Lombok.3 Serinata, West Lombok’s 
Regional Secretary, was also tried for corruption of 
social assistance involving many regional officials 
and politicians.4 Mahrip, the vice regent for the 
2009-2014 period, was found guilty in the case of 
fictitious Official Travel Warrant (Surat Perintah 
Perjalanan Dinas – SPPD).5 Dr. Zaini Aroni, the 
regent for the 2014-2019 period, was found guilty 







lombok.barat.akan.divonis.hari.ini. Accessed on 
January 21, 2021.
4 https://www.jpnn.com/news/dua-anggota-dprd-
tersangka-korupsi-bansos. Accessed on January 21, 2021. 
Also see the directory of rulings of the Supreme Court of 
the Republic of Indonesia number 1818 K /Pid.Sus/ 2012 in 
putusan.mahkamahagung.go.id concerning Agung Purnomo 
Nugroho.
5 See the directory of the Supreme Court of the Republic of 
Indonesia No. 5/Pid.Sus.TPK/2015/PN MTR under the 
name of Dr. H. Mahrip.
6 See the directory of the Supreme Court of the Republic of 
Indonesia No. 175 PK/PID.SUS/2017 under the name of 
Discourses on decentralization continue to 
be an intriguing object of study. Decentralization 
exists within two opposing continua, particularly 
when correlated with corruption. It is believed to 
be an effective remedy for reducing corruption 
as well as a system capable of opening spaces 
where various actors are involved in conducting 
corrupt public administration practices. These 
various debates serve as a backdrop in the 
current study by using social transition to read 
and find meanings behind the reality of perpetual 
corruption at the local level in Lombok. 
Theoretical Review
Decentralization
Decentralization is the transfer of authority 
and responsibility for administrative functions, 
including civilians and the private sector from 
the central to the regional governments (D. 
Rondinelli, 1999; World Bank, 2013). It is the 
delegation of political and legal authority to 
subordinate government to carry out planning 
and decision-making functions (D. A. Rondinelli, 
1981; Shabbir Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). 
Rondinelli  divided decentralization into 
four types: political, administrative, fiscal, 
and market decentralizations (D. Rondinelli, 
1999) .  Administrat ive  decentral izat ion 
includes: deconcentration, delegation, and 
devolution (Shabbir Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). 
Decentralization lessens the central government’s 
monopoly of power by getting more transparency 
and accountable decision-making closer to the 
people (Antlov, 2003; Shah, 2006), this includes 
getting vulnerable communities without access 
to government provided goods and services 
closer (McGuire, 2010). In brief, decentralization 
incorporates the mechanism of public engagement 
within the government based on the argument 
that closer proximity between citizens and the 
government makes it easier for the government 
Haji Zaini Arony. 
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to respond to public needs and demands (Grindle, 
2009; World Bank, 2013). 
Closer proximity between the public and 
regional government is a factor that reinforces 
theoretical-practical arguments stating that 
decentral izat ion promotes  government 
accountability.  Developing countries are 
encouraged by donor organizations to implement 
decentralization as part of the country’s political 
democracy policy package (Asthana, 2012; 
Shabbir Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). The World 
Bank believes that decentralization promotes 
government accountability (World Bank, 2013). 
Arguments and claims of decentralization 
being able to reduce corruption have generated 
a number of antitheses from the results of 
numerous studies. Local corruption has resulted 
from decentralization. Asthana’s research on 
water provision service in India demonstrates 
that decentralization of institutional arrangement 
caused an increase in corruption (Asthana, 2012). 
Two Faces of Decentralization:
Decentralization Reduces Corruption
Decentralization became a system for 
reducing corruption (Fisman & Gatti, 2002). It 
opened up participatory spaces for civil society 
to demand improvements in the public sector 
and encourages government accountability 
(Grindle, 2009). In decentralization, there is the 
proximity factor, which is a condition that enables 
demands and communication to be better and 
more responsively made and carried out between 
public officials and citizens (Bardhan, 2002; 
Umam, 2014; Widmalm, 2008). Decentralization 
encourages people to correctively question 
policies that do not support public interest. It 
provides citizens with direct information when 
misappropriation of government assistance 
occurs (Goel & Nelson, 2011; Shah, 2006). The 
public’s closeness with its local political structure 
makes it easier for collective resistance against 
corruption to unfold. Various information can 
be easily acquired and they can reach more local 
citizens than access to power or authority at the 
national level can (Manor, 2011; Slijepčević et al., 
2020).  In the Indonesian context, decentralization 
opens up spaces for public monitoring, and 
presents space for public aspirations functioning 
as a stage for public scrutiny of the government 
(Buehler, 2010; Ronald L. Holzhacker et al., 2016). 
Decentralization accommodates political space 
for civil society, and it particularly promotes an 
anticorruption movement as an integral part of 
its socio-political movement (Rinaldi et al., 2007). 
Decentralization as a New Argument for 
Corruption 
In practice, decentralization is, instead, 
considered a new reason for the birth of 
corruption. The argument for this reason can 
be observed based on Prud’home’s study results 
which found counterfactual relations with the 
view of decentralization as a system capable of 
reducing corruption. Decentralization creates 
opportunities, produced channels for corruption, 
wherein the flow of resources distribution is 
directed toward local interest groups, which 
is the result of politicians and bureaucrats’ 
submission to group interests at the local level 
(Hadiz, 2010; Karlström, 2015; Kirana, 2014; 
Prud’homme, 1995; Tornquist, 2005; Winters, 
2013). Decentralization presents elite capture 
(Bardhan, 2002; Fjeldstad, 2004). Bribery is on 
the rise at the local level due to an increasingly 
complex government system designed to fill the 
pockets of local bureaucrats (Fan et al., 2009). In 
Indonesia, it has been proven effective to suppress 
local tensions that may fracture national integrity. 
However, it indicates a predatory countenance 
at the local level (Aspinall, 2010). It has become 
a political space for developing new patronage 
networks throughout Indonesia in the aftermath 
of the bureaucratic authoritarian system (Hadiz, 
2004; Silitonga et al., 2016). Oligarchy remains in 
power, despite the authoritarian political system 
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having been replaced by more democratic political 
institutions (Robison & Hadiz in Liddle, 2013). 
Following decentralization, corruption actors have 
shifted from the central to the local level. Patron-
client networks, which was a defining feature of 
the authoritarian regime, have been created in 
the decentralized and new democratic structure. 
The post authoritarian democratic institutions 
produced have revealed the presence of powerful 
locals with access to influence local level policies 
(Silitonga et al., 2016). Decentralization is not 
enough for reducing corruption. As is the case with 
electoral democracy. Therefore, it is crucial that 
the analytical focus be emphasized on democratic 
institutions at the local level (Karlström, 2015; 
Saha et al., 2014)
Theory of Prismatic Society
An Approach
A prismatic society is a society transitioning 
from a fused homogenous traditional state into 
a diffracted heterogeneous modern society. It 
is likened to a homogenous light going into a 
prism. A diversity of colors is created, yet these 
colors remain confined within the prism without 
scattering outwards (Priyono, 2016; Riggs, 1964). 
A temporary process or condition of a society 
between a specific past time and a predictable 
future state is referred to as transition. Under such 
societal conditions, concepts containing particular 
characteristics that apply in the country of study 
need to be used (Riggs, 1964). 
Prismatic  society is  a  society that 
maintains a combination of overlapping modern 
and traditional values, wherein those values 
coexist within a single bureaucracy (Harber, 
1993; Soelaiman, 1998). Developed countries 
demonstrate variables of universalism such 
as achievements and functional specificity 
(professional authority). Whereas developing 
countries show particularism-ascription values. 
Riggs adopted this perspective to examine 
the dynamics of administration in developing 
countries (Soelaiman, 1998; Zwart, 2010). In 
transitional societies, it is impossible for state 
administration to stand alone as a separate entity 
with other aspects contained in the society. State 
administration is not a mechanical system, even 
in developing countries. There are overlapping 
aspects caused by the blending of old and new 
values (heterogeneity), which subsequently 
results in administration practices displaying 
the power of formalism (Riggs, 1964). In the 
context of the present study, it is important that 
the corruption cases are analyzed based on the 
pattern of corruption evident in the transitioning 
society so that a holistic perspective can be 
acquired to explain how perpetual corruption 
unfolds. Accordingly, it is essential that the 
bureaucratic institution be seen as an entity that is 
inseparable from the effect of influential, old, and 
traditional socio-political structure (Riggs, 2015). 
The Perspective of Corruption in Prismatic 
Society
Avarice is not a key determinant of 
corruption. Perhaps corruption emerges from 
the basic nature of prismatic society itself. In the 
traditional system, officials are not paid using 
the central treasury fund, they are paid through 
tributes, rents, and the like. Harber continues by 
stating that such corrupt behavior will continue 
in moderate bureaucracies (Harber, 1993). There 
are formal rules regulating policies, but they differ 
in practice. Rules are formally announced, but 
they are not effectively implemented. It seems 
highly formalistic in reality, but not so in practice. 
For such a contradiction, Riggs referred to it as 
formalism or double talk (Laxmikanth, 2011; 
Riggs, 2015; Zwart, 2010). Corruption, bribery, 
and clientelism are associated with legal and 
bureaucratic processes that serve an unfavorable 
function, according to prismatic administration. 
Laws and procedures may be implemented in 
another normative order that has functional 
implications on the environment they live in 
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without having to change the new environment 
(Zwart, 2010). 
The administration model in a prismatic 
society is known as the Sala Model. This is 
reflected in developing societies (Margono, 
1998). Officials enjoy the power and authority 
their position gives them. Officials of the Sala 
Model formally comply to rules that are specific 
in nature but covertly use their discretion to 
make decisions that tend to be ascriptive, which 
is a feature of particularism (Riggs, 1964). In 
terms of public administration, this approach is 
relevant in explaining the emergence of double 
talk, wherein modern administration rules and 
methods are employed but they are utilized to 
serve particular values and purposes in the public 
domain (Priyono, 2018). 
Social Structure of Prismatic Society
In prismatic societies we can find a unique 
form of institutional structure, distinct from 
other social typologies, which is known as poly-
communal structure. Poly-communal refers to the 
existence of various ethnic and religious groups 
that indicates a state of competition (Laxmikanth, 
2011). The elite opposition group in transitioning 
societies is incapable of gaining access to get in 
touch with key ruling elites, thereby leading to 
hostility. Within such poly-communal structure, we 
can subsequently find poly-functional structure, 
which demonstrates more distribution of function 
than association (Riggs, 1964). I argue that 
such institutional structure is one of the factors 
causing perpetual corruption in transitioning 
societies. Offering conceptual tools to examine 
specific changes in administrative behaviors of 
developing countries serves as a theoretical basis 
to analyze the influence that history, culture, and 
present phenomena in cultures that are no longer 
traditional but have not yet evolved into modern 
societies (Bytyci, 2016; Chapman, 1966; Harber, 
1993; Ikeanyibe, 2017)
Methods
The present study is developed based on the 
interpretive paradigm by using phenomenology 
strategy to understand the reality of perpetual 
corruption post decentralization. The qualitative 
approach was chosen because the researcher 
attempted to obtain a depth of meaning from the 
observed reality and found the meaning behind 
the reality of perpetual corruption. The research 
was conducted from January of 2019 to June 
of 2020 by using observations, interviews, and 
documentation for data collection. Observations 
were done between September 2020 and 
November 2020, wherein intensive interactions 
were carried out with anticorruption activists 
Somasi, Rajabatu, Kasta Lobar, and Fitra of West 
Nusa Tenggara in relation to the anticorruption 
movement activities they undertake. During the 
observations, the researcher obtained information 
about key informants that could be interviewees 
for the study. Information pertaining to the affected 
local structure was also acquired in the process. 
The notes obtained during the observations were 
subsequently compared with the theoretical 
perspectives acquired from the literature review. 
The informants were determined using purposive 
and snowball sampling techniques, in which in-
depth interview method was accordingly applied. 
The researcher then requested for the informants’ 
consent to participate in the study via telephone. 
Consent was easily procured from informants with 
background from anticorruption activists Somasi, 
Rajabatu, Kasta and Fitra NTB, academician (UIN, 
UMMAT and UNRAM), and cultural figures. But, 
specific lobbying tactics needed to be employed 
in securing consent from informants who are 
politicians. Some informants were only willing 
to be interviewed via telephone. Some were also 
willing to be informants on the condition that they 
could remain anonymous. Secondary data in the 
study were retrieved from mass media news, and 
reports published by anticorruption NGOs such 
as Fitra and Somasi of West Nusa Tenggara. The 
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most crucial secondary data in the study were 
obtained from court rulings that have permanent 
legal force. 
These court rulings with permanent 
legal force were most helpful in exploring the 
chronology of the cases and their subsequent 
dynamics even deeper. An example is the asset 
swap corruption case involving Regent Iskandar in 
2008. The informants have their limits in recalling 
the dynamics of cases that transpired long 
ago. The court rulings helped in examining the 
cases deeper, including the actors involved. This 
method is also a part of data source triangulation, 
wherein the researcher also conducted informant 
triangulation jointly and separately. The data 
source triangulation method, which is based 
on informant interviews and court rulings as 
secondary data, was most beneficial in excavating 
corruption cases that occurred in the distant past, 
including in obtaining data validity of the flow of 
funds and values underlying the corruption. 
Data analysis was done by referring to 
Miles and Huberman’s interactive model. First, 
data recorded throughout the data collection 
process were categorized based on types of data 
sources. Classification was made according to 
interview data, court rulings, mass media news, 
and anticorruption-NGO-published reports 
relevant to the corruption cases of study. The 
data were subsequently selected and those that 
did not contribute to answering the research 
question were removed from the created data 
category. Sorting data sources based on the 
examined corruption cases facilitated in finding 
actors, values, and dynamics of the cases. Second, 
interview data were transcribed and presented 
together with summaries of the court rulings and 
important notes made during observations into a 
narrative table in accordance with the analyzed 
corruption cases. These were, subsequently, 
identified based on themes and significant 
statements, and codes were then attributed to 
answer the designed research question. The data 
presented in the table displays the relational 
patterns formulated, and they were analyzed to 
find meanings in the occurrence of perpetual 
corruption in West Lombok. Third, the meanings 
produced were summed up into a credible 
conclusion in the form of narrative writing. The 
data were re-verified by employing data source 
triangulation of observation notes, interview 
transcripts, and summaries from court rulings 
with permanent legal force. Representativeness 
of data sources was also considered in the study 
by conducting repeated analysis so that no data is 




Poly-communalism is described as an 
entity of diverse groups with a tendency of 
low group assimilation. Its power structure 
indicates a strong tendency of particularism. 
Strong support is given to community members 
thereby influencing social relations. As a result, 
a different community pulls the society toward 
a different direction, and there is no consensus 
on what should be done (see Ikeanyibe, 2017). 
The local political structure established post 
decentralization indicates a poly-communal 
structure, which is a feature of prismatic or 
transitional society. Decentralization generated 
new political elites and abandoned old elites. This 
included groups of commoners (jajar karang) 
as a social class in Lombok’s local structure. 
Social-stratification-based local identity politics 
emerged, and these strategic groups succeeded 
in constructing discourses and winning electoral 
political contests by replacing the old elites 
who had been representing a particular social 
stratification for a long period of time. One of the 
significant findings is mobilization support given 
by a group named Raja Batu (short for rakyat jajar 
karang bersatu which means commoners unite). 
This group, specifically, identified its movement 
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as a social-stratification-based resistance, and it 
has been involved as a socio-political movement 
participating in West Lombok’s local political 
structure. We are Jajar Karang, we are the majority 
of the population based on social stratification in 
Lombok yet not many had been representing us 
[our interests] within the local power structure 
(HF, interview June 2019). If we explore further, 
factually speaking, since the New Order, West 
Lombok’s local power structure had mostly been 
held by social entities with a noble (menak) 
background. To be exact, this had continued since 
the mandate for the second term of the West 
Lombok Regent had been given to Lalu Anggrat 
BA in 1960-1965, Lalu A. Rahman in 1972-1978, 
Lalu Ratmaji in 1979-1989 and Lalu Mudjitahid in 
1989-1999. The political shift from authoritarian 
to democratic with the decentralization model 
became a trigger for structural change in local 
power. 
Decentralization became a contradictory 
concept with the rise of perpetual corruption 
at the local government level. Decentralization, 
which opened up the local political structure, has 
resulted in public officials that are untrustworthy. 
Decentralization as a democratic system was not 
accompanied by the local structure’s capacity to 
conduct checks and balances of power. In other 
words, the implementation of decentralization 
was not supported by sufficient local political 
infrastructure to safeguard decentralization. It 
seems that the change from old to new elites did 
not produce participatory channels that support 
public monitoring activities. Local groups that 
were established are not strong enough to 
safeguard the administrative process on account 
of their lack of access to information. 
“I am dismayed with the emergence of 
perpetual corruption in West Lombok. The 
channel of participation to convey aspirations 
relating to strategic policies remains incapable 
of reaching the ruling elites, unless you are part 
of their team of supporters” (Interview with SH, 
June 2019). A similar statement was also made by 
a scholar who is a professor, “There is a dilemmatic 
situation in West Lombok. Decentralization has 
altered the political structure. It is no longer 
controlled by figures of a particular social 
stratification. Political competition is open. But, 
it indicates perpetual corruption” (interview with 
AS, Mei 2020). Such phenomenon, according to 
the perspective of prismatic society, is known 
as poly-communalism, i.e., the tendency of elite 
groups outside of the power structure not having 
access to the elite groups in power. 
The structural change in local politics 
post decentralization produced differentiated 
elite categorization and their existence are 
like embryos that have no influence so they 
can be easily controlled by the ruling elite. 
There is no local consolidation initiated by civil 
society to change the corrupt local structure. In 
transitional democracies the formal accountability 
mechanisms usually do not function (Ian Chalmers 
& Budi Setiyono, 2012). During a period of political 
transition, corruption thrives due to the lack and 
insufficiency of social control in dealing with 
social and political freedom (Moran, 2001, p. 389). 
The state of structure without assimilation 
in this case occurred on account of elite 
fragmentation post decentralization. Social 
control was poorly implemented, keeping in mind 
that the elite groups had differing interests at the 
local level. Such fragmentation of the elite groups 
is considered by Riggs as poly-communalism, 
wherein the level of elite assimilation is lower than 
their level of mobilization. The poly-communal 
structure without assimilation, subsequently, 
became a structure that benefits the local elites 
in controlling public resources for their individual 
and group interests. In a poly-communal structure, 
movements that oppose corruption are difficult to 
carry out. The exceedingly strong fragmentation 
of the elites is the reason for this. So, encouraging 
civil society to be part of the determining forces to 
reduce corruption seems to be doomed to failure 
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so long as the elite assimilation process runs 
at a snail’s pace. Nonetheless, poly-communal 
structure does not necessarily mean a low level 
of participatory space. Bearing in mind that 
poly-communal structure also has the potential 
to produce strong oppositions. As findings in the 
present research show, groups outside of power 
also have the ability to uncover corrupt practices.
Formalization of Corruption
Corruption in the perspective of prismatic 
society is seen as double talk in regulation. 
People abide by specific rules but behave very 
subjectively and are particularistic. Before the 
public they loudly voice their opposition against 
bribery and corruption, as well as corrupt 
practices and behavior. They enforce various rules 
yet they close their eyes to ongoing violations 
(Riggs, 1964). The argument relating to the strong 
formalization of corruption is grounded upon the 
idea of normative structure, in which principles 
and techniques are based on the perspectives of 
Western society, which is identical to industrial 
society. These are transplanted into the normative 
structure of transitional society in which a mixture 
of tradition and modernity still remains. Because 
of the mix of traditional values in the normative 
system of bureaucracy, particularism will emerge 
(Zwart, 2010).  
The corruption that occurred in the three 
periods of political leadership is a social pathology 
that shows a double face. The West Lombok 
bureaucracy has been known to be very open in 
terms of data access. A study conducted by Fitra 
NTB published in January 2020 reinforced the 
assumption that bureaucracy is highly responsive 
to public requests of data and information. 
The West Lombok government is very open in 
terms of efforts promoting budget transparency, 
which includes their positive response when we 
encourage a budget clinic for the public (interview 
with R, anti-corruption activist, January 2020). 
Corruption, on the other hand, continues to be a 
major concern at the local level. Such a condition 
reflects the presence of a pseudo or façade 
democracy, i.e., a condition in which democratic 
institutions and mechanism are established 
but do not substantively function, a system that 
operates within artificial democratic instruments 
(Diamond, 2002, Haynes, 2005,).
Civil society openly became a part of those 
engaged in the existing participatory channels. 
In the case of regional asset data, which had, 
thus far, been problematic in West Lombok, the 
ruling elites involved civil society groups as a 
part of the working group. They received a formal 
letter of assignment signed directly by the West 
Lombok Regent as stipulated in Decree number 
1960A/23.A/KAD/2013. Results of their work 
in documenting asset data have provided a lot 
of information concerning assets that have been 
problematic. Civil society groups were involved in 
the documentation of regional asset data and the 
results provided considerable information about 
assets that may be corrupted by the ruling elites 
(S G, interview in December, 2019). 
An anatomy of the corruption case in West 
Lombok reinforces the poli-normativism of 
corruption. The property/asset swap corruption 
involving the former property of the West Lombok 
Regent office is an empirical fact that corroborates 
this. The case began with a meeting held in March 
2003 between Haji Iskandar as the Regent of West 
Lombok at the time and Izzat Hussein, a contractor 
from Varindo Lombok Inti, that was a discussion 
about doing a property swap of the former office 
and property of the old administrative buildings 
of West Lombok. The Regent of West Lombok, 
H. Iskandar, asked Izzat Hussein as the director 
of Varindo Lombok Inti Ltd. Co. to prepare a 
property swap proposal. The regent then ordered 
his subordinate to prepare an estimated price 
by referring to the estimated value made by the 
contractor. A team was subsequently established, 
and they fulfilled the formal requirements as 
though land price appraisal had been done by the 
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appraisal team. This property swap case resulted 
in financial loss to the state by as much as IDR 
36.540.159.819,55.7  
Another case featuring a strong formalization 
of corruption is apparent in the social assistance 
fund corruption case that involved the 2009 
Regional Secretary of West Lombok, H. Serinata, 
along with a number of regional officials and 
members of the West Lombok Regional House of 
Representatives. The corruption case that resulted 
in billions of rupiahs of state financial loss was 
uncovered when fake stamps were found to be 
used on behalf of hundreds of social organizations 
in West Lombok which posed as recipients of the 
assistance. While in fact, there had never been 
any receipt of such social assistance funds. Based 
on the trial records, the funds were channeled to 
legislative members for purposes outside of the 
social assistance program. This is an interesting 
case to study, keeping in mind that there are two 
rules in play. Formal requests and disbursement 
mechanisms were defined, but in reality, the 
ruling elites in West Lombok’s bureaucracy 
deviated from implementing the rules. Facts in 
trial revealed that just the oral request made by 
the regional secretary was enough to request and 
disburse social assistance funds without having 
to fulfill the defined formal requirements. It is 
evident that there are two rules operating within 
a single bureaucratic system. In other words, the 
formalization of corruption works systematically 
by utilizing all potential resources and supporting 
7 The legal process of former Regent H. Iskandar was 
discontinued because he was suffering from dementia, 
which is a mental disorder indicated by reduced cognitive 
function particularly relating to memory. As a result, the 
panel of judges issued Court Verdict Number 23/PID.B/
TPK/2008/PN.JKT.PST. dated February 16, 2009, which 
among others stipulates that criminal case document 
Number 23/PID.B/2008/ PN.JKT.PST. under the name 
Drs. H. Iskandar be returned to the Public Attorney of the 
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and instructs 
the defendant, Drs. H. Iskandar, be released from custody. 
The case process can be searched in the Directory of Court 
Rulings of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia: 
putusan.mahkamahagung.go.id. 
local structures. This is an example of corruption 
in prismatic society with its institutionalized 
Sala bureaucratic countenance. The ruling elites 
instruct their lower officials as followers, who 
obey to gain protection, maintain good image, and 
surely to influence their career position.8      
A review of another corruption case that 
reinforces the corruption argument in prismatic 
society is the corruption case that led to the 
arrest of the 2009-2014 and 2014-2019 period 
Regent of West Lombok, Dr Zaini Aroni, in the 
case of permit submission for the Buwun Mas 
Sekotong West Lombok tourism area. The case 
started with the submission of several permits 
to open up a tourism site in Sekotong, which was 
submitted by the Djaja Business Group Ltd. Co. to 
the Regional Government of West Lombok, which 
included space utilization permit; principal permit 
for expansion of foreign investment; location 
permit; and land utilization permit. During the 
period when the permits were being processed, 
the Regent at the time requested a number of 
vehicles, cash, and a plot of land from the investor 
to accelerate the licensing process. Requests 
that were not fulfilled resulted in technical 
difficulties in the licensing process. The formalized 
structure observed in the case review seems to be 
dominating. Regulations in the licensing process 
are understood differently, thereby creating a 
space not unlike a bazaar-canteen where prices 
are not as certain as the amounts listed in the 
formal regulations. Written regulations have 
become a point of entry to renegotiate the entire 
process and price that must be paid by the permit 
applicant. In the context of public space, this is 
seen as the emergence of double talk. Modern 
administrative rules and methods are used, but 
they are employed to serve other purposes and 
values. Corruption becomes institutionalized as 
it involves various actors in the power structure. 
8  The track record of the case was processed based on various 
sources and by utilizing news portals containing the trial 
process on the www.kejaksaan.go.id webpage.
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Officials enjoy their strategic position that allows 
them to receive bribes, they utilize the lower 
structure to generate extra personal income 
aside from their official income as a civil servant 
(Priyono, 2018, Riggs, 1964).
In the December 2019 corruption case 
concerning the rehabilitation of mosques after 
the Lombok earthquake, the case began with a 
20% cut taken from each of the mosques receiving 
reconstruction funds from the central government. 
The mosques received reconstruction funds in the 
amount of 50 to 200 million rupiahs each, in which 
13 mosques in West Lombok were recipients. A 
review of the corruption case indicates it had 
features of the Sala Model wherein the Head of the 
Administrative Affairs Division in West Lombok’s 
ministry of religious affairs instructed a direct 
subordinating staff to make a 20% cut. It was a 
tiered corruption structure as the direct staff to 
the head of division subsequently instructed a 
lower-level staff in the Religious Affairs Office to 
directly withdraw the cut from mosque caretakers 
receiving the reconstruction funds. Implications 
of technical difficulties in disbursement of funds 
were mentioned to the mosque caretakers when 
they did not provide the cut the perpetrators 
requested. The corruption model was structured, 
wherein the subordinate provides a remuneration 
or kickback to a higher structure with more 
authority as a guarantee to getting a promotion.9 
An analysis of such a case from the perspective 
of prismatic society indicates a structured 
relationship between administrator-follower 
which consequently creates administrative 
hurdles to open up negotiations (Riggs, 1964).          
Discussion
Following the findings on the ground, 
it is clear that there are connections between 
9  Reviews of corruption cases like the Sala Model are open 
in trial. The track records of cases can be acquired via the 
Mataram District Court case search information system 
portal, which is accessible at sipp.pn-mataram.go.id
decentralization and the prismatic society system, 
which leads to an increase in corruption at the 
local level. Decentralization has become a new 
reason for corruption to grow because institutions 
found in prismatic society lack enough power to 
put pressure on the ruling elites. In a prismatic 
society, the new elites generated by the change 
in political structure are still in the earliest stages 
of developing their power and as a result they are 
easily co-opted by the ruling elites (Riggs, 1964). 
The prismatic local structure provided 
opportunities for ruling local elites to continuously 
conduct corrupt practices due to the structure’s 
inability to limit the elite’s power. It seems that 
various anticorruption approaches and policies 
will be incapable of reducing corruption so long 
as no change occurs in the local structure. There 
must be a constraining structure that limits local 
elites from exerting their political power. 
An approach that overemphasizes the 
institutional aspect and localizes the influence of 
democracy outside of state institutions involving 
the community is considered to be the cause of 
failure in corruption eradication (Djani, 2013). 
Focusing on incentives to formal institutions does 
not seem to be enough, it is important to consider 
influential local aspects as well (Hira, 2016). In 
other words, the diagnosis on corruption so far, 
according to the view of universalism, is that it 
often occurs in a concept of uniformity. Hence, it is 
important to diagnose corruption based on certain 
organisms, of which particularism is one: a value 
that prioritizes personal interest or a form of non-
universalistic public goods distribution (Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2006). Accordingly, corruption should be 
seen as a result of disorganization where there 
is an unstable intergroup relationship within a 
recognized system and authority (Huntington, 
1973).  
Such a universal approach is no longer 
sufficient for reading into the complexities of 
corruption. Corruption as a scientific study 
is examined more through the perspective of 
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dualism.10 This implies putting one approach 
over another. This argument becomes clear in the 
context of corruption studies in Indonesia. Law-
enforcement-based movements are not strong 
enough to reduce corruption, and vice versa, 
institutional-reform-based movements do not 
have sufficient capacity to confine the emergence 
of corruption based on the abuse of public 
mandate (Butt, 2011; Juwono, 2016; Macmillan, 
2011). Corruption should be seen as linkages 
between structure and agency, to be precise, as 
a duality that continues to generate corruption 
as social practice. Accordingly, decentralization 
should be accompanied by efforts to open up 
participatory channels so that accountability and 
checks and balances are fostered at the local level. 
To achieve such a condition of accountability in the 
Indonesian context, civil society and mass media 
capable of playing an optimal role are required 
to bring about proper political competition at the 
local level (Kirana, 2014).
Conclusion
There are linkages that mutually complement 
each other facilitating the expansion of corruption 
at the local level in West Lombok Regency. The 
prismatic structure opened up opportunities 
for creating a perpetual state of corruption. The 
social structure with its poly-communal and poly-
normative qualities resulted in poor assimilation 
as a collective entity. The prismatic structure 
made it unviable for effective monitoring of public 
administration to develop, and this condition was 
exacerbated by the elites having a very difficult 
time assimilating. Decentralization and poly-
10 Dualism is a perspective in social science that attempts to 
place one perspective over another. It is set as a turning point 
for Anthony Giddens to bring about a theoretical synthesis 
of the tension between subjectivism and objectivism, 
voluntarism and determinism, i.e., the structuration theory. 
In the current study, this implies that it does not highlight a 
single approach, but it attempts to combine two approaches 
or discourses that have not been done much. Herry Priyono 
discusses this theme quite straightforwardly in reading the 
thoughts of Anthony Giddens.   
communal structure are a duality that has influence 
in perpetuating corruption at the local level. The 
two structures provide local political elites the 
opportunity to continue producing a corrupt public 
administration system at the local level.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
This research contributes to the field of social 
and political sciences by providing a perspective 
on the emergence of perpetual corruption in 
transitional societies. It also indicates that an 
approach to corruption that heavily focuses on law 
enforcement and bureaucratic reform would be 
insufficient without considering local structures 
affecting the spread of corruption at the local level. 
Local structures must be encouraged to generate 
checks and balances in order for anticorruption 
policies to succeed.  
Limitation of Study
As a product of science and knowledge, 
scientific work is never final. There is always an 
antithesis to the thesis. Admittedly, this study 
has its limitations, particularly in relation to its 
research methodology. First, the study is limited 
by the informants’ ability to recall the various 
dynamics that occurred when discussing the 
various corruption cases under examination. This 
particularly applies to old cases. To address such 
limitations, relevant information such as court 
rulings that have permanent legal force were 
collected and examined as part of the secondary 
data. This is a rather effective means to address 
issues relating to informants not being able to 
remember the details of the cases. Second, the 
research was carried out in West Lombok Regency, 
and as a consequence, it has not explored the 
various local structures affecting the emergence 
of perpetual corruption post decentralization 
in other regions throughout Indonesia. Further 
studies are, thus, necessary to expand the scope of 
the research so that a generalization of this issue 
in other communities can be defined.
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